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ABSTRACT 
A distinctive feature of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is cognitive 
defusion.  Rapid word repetition is one of the exercises used in ACT to promote defusion.  
Previous research has examined the effect of this exercise with the general population, using 
words representing negative self-referential thoughts.  Studies have found that discomfort and 
believability of these thoughts decrease more following this defusion exercise as compared to a 
thought distraction task.   
The present study evaluated the effects of the word repetition defusion exercise using 
content reflecting academic distress, in an undergraduate sample primed to feel academic 
anxiety.  The defusion exercise was compared to a thought control task and a control condition 
(reading).  The statement “I am a failure” was rated for discomfort, believability, and willingness 
pre- and post-intervention.   
There was no statistically significant difference between the defusion and thought control 
interventions in changing any of the ratings.  However, some statistically significant differences 
were found between the interventions and the control condition (reading an article).  Defusion 
was superior to the control condition in decreasing discomfort ratings.  Thought control was 
superior to the control condition in decreasing believability ratings.  Willingness ratings 
decreased significantly in the thought control condition relative to the control condition.   
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was used as a behavioral measure 
to gauge any changes in psychological flexibility. The IRAP compared latency of correct 
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responses to tasks consistent and inconsistent with negative self-relevant thinking about 
academics.  No statistically significant effect was found between conditions for the IRAP, 
indicating no difference in effect on psychological flexibility. 
Differences in the outcome of this study and previous studies are discussed.  Future 
studies should examine the word repetition and other cognitive defusion techniques in specific 
clinical populations.  Future research should work toward refining measures of defusion.  
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I. COGNITIVE DEFUSION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY WITH SELF 
RELEVANT ACADEMIC DISTRESS STIMULI 
 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is a mindfulness-based intervention, one of 
the contextualistic approaches that constitute the third generation of behavior therapy.  ACT 
posits that problems in contextual control over cognitive processes can cause or worsen 
psychological dysfunction.  These problems result in psychological inflexibility, where private 
events (e.g., thoughts, emotions, sensations) function to inhibit behaviors which would further an 
individual’s chosen values and goals.  ACT aims to create contexts in which behavior is more 
sensitive to environmental contingencies germane to values and goals and less sensitive to the 
form or frequency of private events.  ACT does this through behavior change techniques and 
through mindfulness and acceptance techniques.  (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Hayes, 
Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006)  
Reviews of ACT outcomes support its efficacy and have shown nearly identical overall 
effect sizes (Hayes, et al., 2006; Ost, 2008; Powers, Zum Vorde Sive Vording, & Emmelkamp, 
2009; Ruiz, 2010).  The most recent meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials of ACT, with 
18 studies in the analysis, found an effect size of 0.68 (Hedge’s g) compared to wait list and 
psychological placebos, 0.42 compared with treatment as usual, and equivalent effects when 
compared with established treatments (e.g., cognitive behavior therapy, cognitive therapy, 
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systematic desensitization) (Powers, et al., 2009).  However, a reanalysis of the data yielded a 
significant effect even compared to established treatments, with an effect size of 0.27 (Levin & 
Hayes, 2009).  A recent broad review of all empirical evidence for ACT notes its efficacy and 
generally large effect sizes (Ruiz, 2010).  All authors conclude that further studies are needed to 
fully determine any advantage of ACT over traditional treatments or vice versa, as ACT is still a 
relatively new intervention.        
 
Need to Examine Mediators and Mechanisms of Change 
Kazdin (2007) argues that a large problem in psychotherapy research is the lack of 
evidence that interventions work through their hypothesized mechanisms, despite years of 
empirical support of the symptom change produced by standard interventions.  He illustrates the 
methodological problem of establishing a timeline of cause and effect between mediator and 
symptom change with examples from research on cognitive therapy.  Though change in 
cognitive content has long been presumed as a mechanism in cognitive therapy, this is not 
supported empirically.  Existing evidence actually suggests that cognitions are not a mediator or 
mechanism of cognitive therapy.  (Kazdin, 2007)  
A well-designed study sensitive to these methodological issues found that changes in 
negative cognitive content did not precede or predict changes in depressive symptoms (Jarrett, 
Vittengl, Doyle, & Clark, 2007).  In a series of studies examining the components of cognitive 
behavioral therapy, no added benefit was found from cognitive interventions, leaving only 
behavioral activation components (Jacobson et al., 1996; Gortner, Gollan, Dobson, & Jacobson, 
1998).  In a study examining moderate and severe levels of depression, individuals showed 
poorer outcomes in a cognitive therapy condition compared to behavioral activation (Dimidjian 
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et al., 2006).  Findings in these studies are not anomalies.  Although cognitive behavioral 
interventions have an unquestionably substantial evidence for treatment outcome, confirmation 
of treatment processes has been elusive. Longmore and Worrell (2007), in a review of the 
literature on cognitive behavior therapy, found no substantial support for cognitive change as a 
mediator of treatment outcome.  In addition, they noted that component studies have consistently 
shown no increase in efficacy due to cognitive interventions.  
In light of years of training these interventions to thousands of clinicians, it would seem 
wise to explore mediators and mechanisms of action in ACT sooner rather than later.  The 
development and application of the therapy could then evolve based on empirical findings.  This 
can be accomplished from a bottom-up approach, without waiting for large dismantling studies, 
through methods such as testing individual components, processes, or even specific techniques 
(Hinton & Gaynor, 2010).  Hayes (2008) emphasizes that attention to mediation has been part of 
the development of ACT since its inception.  Kazdin likens the search for mediators, and 
ultimately mechanisms of change, to the strategy of chess, which is “won on multiple fronts,” 
through “an integrated series of actions, and converging moves” (2007, p. 11).  
One method of progressing with this bottom-up approach is to investigate processes or 
components unique to ACT.  Compared with traditional cognitive behavior therapy, one of 
ACT’s most distinguishing features is cognitive defusion.  Defusion is the process that directly 
ties ACT to the behavior analysis of language in Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Roche, 2001).  If ACT is to differentiate itself from other cognitive behavior 
therapies and to maintain theoretical coherence, then cognitive defusion should be closely 
examined.              
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Cognitive Defusion 
ACT identifies fusion as a potentially problematic process resulting from normal human 
verbal learning.  Fusion occurs when “certain verbal functions of events exert strong stimulus 
control over responding to the exclusion of other directly and indirectly available psychological 
functions” (Wilson & DuFrene, 2008, p. 54).  Problematic fusion often involves aversive 
functions of language or thoughts.  This causes difficulty when responding is very sensitive to 
those aversive functions that result in neglect or avoidance of valued activity.  Other functions of 
thoughts might be available but are weaker.  This is sometimes conceived as a restriction of 
probable responses to verbal stimuli, producing a narrow repertoire of responding.  These narrow 
repertoires are of concern when they impede psychologically healthy behavior or induce 
psychologically destructive behavior.  (Wilson & DuFrene, 2008; Wilson & Murrell, 2004)   
Fusion often takes the form of responding to thoughts as if their content were literally 
true (Hayes et al., 2006).  This can promote avoidance of desired activity or encourage undesired 
behaviors.  Examples of fusion abound.  An example relevant to the undergraduate sample in our 
study might be a thought like “I’m not smart enough for this class.”  In fusion, this thought might 
function to inhibit studying, asking questions in class, going to class, or getting help from the 
professor.  Someone with depression might have the thought “I don’t have enough energy to go 
out,” and respond to it by avoiding activity.  Someone with trichotillomania might have the 
thought “I can’t stand this urge, I’ll pull just one more hair,” and respond to it by pulling out his 
or her hair.   
Cognitive defusion is the process of lessening the strong, inflexible verbal stimulus 
control of fusion.  Cognitive defusion techniques create contexts in which behavior becomes less 
sensitive to the content of thoughts, which have previously functioned to encourage avoidance 
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and inhibit valued action (Hayes et al., 2006; Blackledge, 2007).  Sometimes this is described as 
changing how “one interacts with or relates to thoughts” (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 8).  Defusion has 
also been described as broadening repertoires in response to thoughts (Wilson & DuFrene, 
2008).  In this sense, any exercise that involves new ways of experiencing or responding to 
thoughts enhances defusion.  
Defusion techniques often attempt to disrupt what is referred to as the context of 
literality.  This is the context of our verbal culture which functions to encourage an experience of 
thought content as literally true.  Our verbal culture encourages responding to thoughts as if they 
are literally true in various ways.  One way is the culture’s focus on thought content rather than 
on the process of thinking.  Conventional speech patterns also help us to think literally about 
thoughts.  Speaking at a consistent and culturally determined pace, for example, allows us to 
focus on the meaning of words rather than their sounds (Hayes et al., 2006; Blackledge, 2007). 
Many defusion exercises focus attention on the process of thinking, on noticing thoughts 
as they occur.  An example is observing thoughts in an eyes-closed exercise where the thoughts 
are visualized on leaves floating down a stream.  Labeling thoughts as thoughts (e.g., I am 
having the thought that . . .) is another example.  Defusion exercises that target conventional 
speech patterns include repeating thought content over and over at a rapid pace, until the sounds 
of the words become prominent and their literal meaning becomes less prominent.  Manner of 
speech can also be altered in a defusion exercise.  Thoughts might be sung or said in a silly 
voice, for example.  While altering conventional speech patterns, these exercises also draw 
attention to the process of thinking over literal content of thoughts. (Blackledge, 2007)    
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Empirical Examinations of Defusion 
Several studies have focused on defusion, including studies of defusion as a mediator of 
outcome in a full ACT treatment package, as the sole component in a brief treatment, and finally, 
examination of specific defusion techniques (Hesser, Westin, Hayes, & Anderson, 2009; Hinton 
& Gaynor, 2010; Healy et al., 2008; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004; Masuda et al., 
2009; Masuda et al., 2010).  Findings of these studies are briefly described below.  
Hesser and colleagues (2009) examined participants’ in-session defusion-consistent 
statements during an ACT treatment for tinnitus distress.  An instance of a defusion-consistent 
statement was defined as “a verbal statement that included the client noticing, labeling and 
separating self from a private experience (e.g., a thought, feeling)” (p. 525).  Along with 
frequency of defusion-consistent statements, raters gave each instance an “extensiveness” score, 
indicating the strength or depth of the statement.  A “peak” level score was assigned for each 
session, being the highest “extensiveness” rating achieved during that session.  
Results showed that frequency and peak level of defusion-consistent statements early in 
treatment predicted long term outcome.  Further, because outcome measures were taken 
throughout the study, the experimenters were able to demonstrate that changes in defusion 
occurred before improvements in outcomes.  The experimenters conclude that this is preliminary 
evidence for defusion as a mediator in ACT.  (Hesser et al., 2009) 
Cognitive defusion as the sole component of a brief treatment for distressed college 
students was compared to a waitlist control condition (Hinton & Gaynor, 2010).  Participants 
were experiencing general psychological distress, as measured by scoring at least one SD above 
the mean on the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) and one SD below the mean on the Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale (RSES).  The treatment consisted of three weekly sessions, including a 
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defusion rationale and defusion techniques the experimenters refer to as vocalizing strategies.   
These strategies included repeating negative self-referential thoughts aloud rapidly, saying them 
slowly, saying them in a different voice, saying them like a radio announcer, and saying them 
like brief stories—with various qualities such as boring or outrageous.  
Results showed statistically significant effects on all outcome measures (BSI, RSES, and 
the Beck Depression Inventory-II) in the cognitive defusion condition.  Large effects sizes were 
found for self-esteem, general psychological distress, and depressive symptoms.  Similar results 
were found for the waitlist participants once they received the defusion intervention.  
The cognitive defusion condition produced a significant increase in psychological 
flexibility, as measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II).  The 
experimenters also constructed a subscale of the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory for use as a 
process measure of defusion for each session.  They note that these scores suggested a gradual 
improvement in defusion over sessions.  Outcome measures were not administered at each 
session, so a timeline that could establish whether defusion preceded or followed change in 
outcome was not produced.  (Hinton & Gaynor, 2010) 
 Another study examined the effect of normal versus defused self-statements in a sample 
of undergraduate students (Healy, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Keigh, Luciano, & Wilson, 
2008).  Negative self-statements were presented visually.  The phrase “I am having the thought 
that” was used in conjunction with self-statements to promote cognitive defusion.  Examples of 
normal and defused statements are “I am a bad person” and “I am having the thought that I am a 
bad person,” respectively.  Ten different negative self-statements were used. The statements 
appeared on a computer screen for 6 seconds.  Participants then rated discomfort, believability, 
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and willingness with regard to the statements (i.e., willingness to read and think about the 
statements).  
Defused presentations elicited significantly lower discomfort ratings than normal 
presentations of the negative thoughts.  Defused presentations also elicited significantly higher 
willingness ratings than normal presentations.  Although higher ratings of believability were 
found for defused presentations, this was explained as possibly an artifact of the wording.  It was 
hypothesized that participants were responding to whether or not it was believable that they were 
“having the thought that . . .” rather than believability of the content of the negative self-
statement itself.  The experimenters concluded that the results supported the use of cognitive 
defusion in increasing willingness to experience disturbing cognitive content and in reducing the 
discomfort of having the cognitive content.  In an effort to examine demand characteristics, 
subjects were told that the exercise would either work, would not work, or would have no effect 
on the impact of the negative self statements.  The impact of the defusion exercise was the same 
regardless of what subjects were told about the impact of the exercise.  (Healy et al., 2008) 
  Three studies investigated the effect of a specific cognitive defusion exercise used in 
ACT that consists of rapidly repeating aloud a word or phrase, commonly known as the Milk-
Milk-Milk exercise (Hayes, et al., 1999, p. 154).  The first was a time-series study (Masuda et 
al., 2004).  The repeated-word defusion exercise was alternated with a thought control task (deep 
breathing and positive thinking) and a control task (reading).  Brief rationales were included for 
defusion and thought control conditions.  Participants produced their own self-relevant negative 
thoughts and reduced them to one word (e.g. “I am too fat;” “fat”).  This word was repeated 
aloud rapidly for 30 seconds during the exercise.  Discomfort and believability of the thoughts 
were rated on two visual analog scales pre- and post-intervention.  The cognitive defusion 
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exercise reduced ratings on both believability and discomfort of these negative thoughts as 
compared to the other conditions.  This finding held across all eight participants.  
The second study explored the effect of different durations of the same repeated-word 
exercise (Masuda et al., 2009).  Participants again used one-word versions of their own self-
relevant negative thoughts.  Statistically significant reductions in ratings of discomfort and 
believability were found.  The reductions were at their greatest after 3-10 seconds for discomfort 
and 20-30 seconds for believability.  The experimenters note that this suggests that discomfort 
and believability are separate “functional aspects of cognitive events” (2009, p. 1).  
The third study examined the same defusion exercise in a group design, comparing it 
with a thought distraction exercise (Masuda et al., 2010).  The thought distraction exercise 
consisted of instructions to think of something else, prompted periodically by the experimenter 
with statements such as “don’t think about it.”  Both conditions included rationales.  As in 
previous studies, subjects generated their own self-relevant negative thoughts and reduced them 
to one word.  Discomfort and believability of these thoughts were rated pre- and post-
intervention.  Defusion was found to reduce discomfort and believability ratings significantly 
more than thought distraction.  However, the thought distraction exercise did reduce discomfort 
ratings significantly more than the control condition.  
A subgroup with higher depressive symptoms was used for additional analyses.  
Participants were undergraduate students and those with scores on the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II at or above the mean of the sample were selected.  For this subgroup, defusion was 
not superior to thought distraction in reducing discomfort, but it was superior to the control 
condition.  There was also no statistically significant differential effect by condition on 
believability ratings. 
10 
 
 
Aims of the Present Study 
The empirical studies described above suggest that word repetition, as a specific defusion 
technique, is effective in at least temporarily reducing discomfort and believability of self-
relevant negative thoughts in the general population.  It also appears that defusion could be 
superior to thought control interventions in reducing discomfort and believability.  However, 
when a subsample with depressive symptoms was analyzed, this effect appeared less robust.  
Researchers have yet to examine this specific defusion technique in other populations, with 
distinct psychological difficulties, or with particular problematic thought content.  
The present study evaluated the effects of the word repetition defusion exercise using 
content reflecting academic distress.  Procedures were adapted from Masuda and colleagues 
(2004).  A defusion exercise was compared to a thought control exercise.  A distraction task 
(reading an article) was used as an experimental control condition.  Participants were 
undergraduate students who were primed to think about academic failure.  “I am a failure” was 
used as the thought content.  
Based on previous research findings (Healy et al., 2008; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda et 
al., 2009; Masuda et al., 2010), it was hypothesized that the cognitive defusion exercise would 
result in a greater decrease in discomfort, a greater decrease in believability, and a greater 
increase in willingness than the other conditions.  In addition, a secondary hypothesis was that a 
purported behavioral measure of psychological flexibility, the Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure (IRAP), would indicate a greater increase in flexibility as a result of the defusion 
exercise compared to the other conditions. 
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II. METHOD 
 
Pilot Study with IRAP Stimuli and Intervention Rationales 
Participants.  A separate sample of 104 undergraduate students was surveyed prior to the 
main study.  Plausibility of experimental rationales (cognitive defusion and thought control) was 
evaluated.  IRAP stimuli were also tested to ensure their desired function.  These participants 
were recruited from the psychology department subject pool.  There were 63 female and 41 male 
participants. Seventy-nine were Caucasian, 17 African-American, 4 Asian, 2 Hispanic, and 2 
self-identified as “other.”  The mean age of participants was 20 years old (range = 18-31). 
Intervention Rationales.  Participants were presented with the rationale of both the 
cognitive defusion and the thought control interventions as ways to cope with the thought “I am a 
failure.”  Participants then filled out rating forms asking “How helpful will this exercise be to 
cope with the difficult thought?”  They rated both interventions from 1 (not helpful at all) to 7 
(extremely helpful).  Thought control (M = 5.17) received significantly higher ratings than 
cognitive defusion (M = 3.78), t (103) = -6.372, p = .000.  This indicates that participants 
believed thought control would be more helpful than cognitive defusion.  Participants were also 
asked, “When you get these kinds of anxious thoughts about academics, which is closer to what 
you normally do?” (cognitive defusion or thought control).  Seventy-five percent responded that 
thought control is closer to what they normally do.  Participants were asked which intervention 
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they thought was a better idea and 74% responded that thought control was a better idea.  These 
results suggest that cognitive defusion had no advantage over thought control based on rationale 
alone. 
 
IRAP Stimuli.  Potential stimuli for the IRAP included 39 positive and 49 negative 
words related to academic performance (e.g., wise, studious, stupid, feebleminded).  Participants 
were given the instruction “Take a moment and imagine that you are having your absolute worst 
day at school.  Imagine that you are asked to think the following thoughts about yourself.  Rate 
how uncomfortable it would be to think the thought by placing one mark on the line.”  They 
were then presented with a list of sentences such as “I am stupid” and “I am intelligent.”  They 
rated how uncomfortable the thoughts were on a visual analog scale, with Not At All 
Uncomfortable at 0 mm on the scale and Very Uncomfortable at 100 mm on the scale.  The six 
negative stimuli with the highest ratings of discomfort (a disappointment, a failure, dumb, 
inadequate, useless, unsuccessful) and the six positive stimuli with the lowest ratings of 
discomfort (able, knowledgeable, capable, adequate, qualified, an achiever) were used in the 
IRAP task. 
 
Main Study 
Participants.  Participants were 99 undergraduate students at the University of 
Mississippi, aged 18 years or older.  They were recruited from the Psychology Department 
subject pool.  There were 69 female and 28 male participants.  Sixty-eight were Caucasian, 22 
African-American, 6 Asian, 1 Hispanic, and 1 self-identified as “other.”  The mean age of 
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participants was 20 years old (range = 18-44).  Two participants failed to fill out demographic 
information. 
Measures. 
Demographics.  Demographic information was collected as part of the IRAP computer 
task. 
 
Psychological Flexibility: AAQ-II. The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II is a 
scale designed to measure psychological flexibility.  Psychological flexibility is defined in ACT 
as “the process of contacting the present moment fully as a conscious human being and 
persisting or changing behavior in the service of chosen values” (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 9).  The 
original 10-item version was used in this study, though more recent psychometric analysis has 
produced a 7-item version.  Items are answered on a 7-point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate 
more psychological flexibility.  
The AAQ-II has shown adequate psychometric properties (Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter, 
Guenole, Orcutt, Waltz, & Zettle, in press).  Test-retest reliability is reported as .81 at three 
months and .79 at twelve months.  Internal consistency is reported as .84.  The AAQ-II predicts 
outcomes consistent with theory, while also demonstrating discriminant validity.  
General Psychological Distress: OQ-45.  The Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45) was 
used to evaluate equivalence of groups with respect to general psychological distress.  It is a 45-
item questionnaire assessing psychological symptoms, interpersonal functioning, and social role 
functioning.  Items are answered on a 5-point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate higher levels 
of distress, with scores ranging from 0 to 180.  The OQ-45 has shown adequate reliability (test-
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retest = .78-.84; internal consistency = .93) and validity in college age samples (Lambert, 
Hansen, Umpress, Lunnen, Okiishu, Burlingame, & Reisinger, 2001). 
Academic Distress: LASSI Anxiety Scale. Attitudes and behaviors related to learning 
and studying are assessed in the 77-question Learning and Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI), 
which consists of ten scales.  The 8-item Anxiety scale was used in this study to assess 
equivalence of groups with respect to academic distress.  The scale consists of items such as: “I 
worry that I will flunk out of school,” which are rated on a 5-point Likert scale.  Lower scores 
indicate poorer functioning (higher academic anxiety).  The LASSI has been found to be reliable 
and valid for the evaluation of skills related to academic success in undergraduates  (Weinstein, 
et al., 1988; Weinstein & Palmer, 2002). 
Discomfort/Believability/Willingness Rating Forms. Instructions remind the participant 
of the thought being rated (“I’m a failure”).  Participants rated each of the following by marking 
a point on a visual analog scale (0 mm – 100 mm): (1) Discomfort: “How uncomfortable is the 
thought?” (2) Believability: “How believable (true) is the thought?” (3) Willingness: “How 
willing are you to have this thought?” 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). The Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure (IRAP) is a computer task which has been explored as a measure of implicit beliefs or 
attitudes, from an RFT perspective (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Power, Hayden, Milne, & 
Stewart, 2006; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010).  The IRAP is 
somewhat similar in procedure to the more widely known Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  In the IAT, it is assumed that participants respond 
more quickly and accurately when required to associate stimuli in ways consistent with their 
implicit attitudes.  
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The IRAP is based on a similar assumption.  However, the IRAP allows examination of 
specific relationships between stimuli.  Relational terms (e.g., similar/opposite, better/worse, 
true/false) can be used to test these specific relationships.  (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2010) 
Quicker responses in relating stimuli during the IRAP are held to indicate consistency 
with a participant’s verbal learning history.  The IRAP requires participants to “respond quickly 
and accurately in ways that are either consistent or inconsistent with their pre-experimentally 
established verbal relations” (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006, p. 170).  Mean response latencies are 
compared between “consistent” and “inconsistent” trials.  
The “IRAP effect” of quicker responding in consistent trials has been found in previous 
studies, but the reliability and validity of the IRAP are not yet clear (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; 
Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010).  How these trials are presented in the IRAP is also still evolving 
(Levin, Hayes, & Waltz, 2010).  
For the purposes of this study, it was hypothesized that increased psychological 
flexibility due to the defusion exercise would reduce any “IRAP effect.”  In other words, 
responding to consistent and inconsistent trials would become more similar as psychological 
flexibility increased.  Latency would decrease for inconsistent trials. 
The IRAP for this study began by directing the participant to stimuli (words) that 
appeared in two boxes at the top of a computer screen.  Participants were instructed to read the 
words together as a sentence (e.g., “I am capable”).  Participants then responded to this sentence 
by picking between two choices at the bottom of the screen (“true” or “false”).  
For each trial, a category stimulus appeared at the top of the screen (“I am” or “I am 
not”), a target stimulus just below (a disappointment, a failure, dumb, inadequate, useless, 
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unsuccessful, able, knowledgeable, capable, adequate, qualified, or an achiever), and two 
relations at either side of the bottom of the screen from which the participant was to choose 
(“true” and “false”).  Choices were made by pressing the “e” or “i” key on the keyboard (see 
example below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Half of the trials were consistent with negative self-relevant thinking about academics.  In 
other words, the correct response in a trial would be “true” in response to “I am a failure,” 
“false” in response to “I am an achiever,” and “true” in response to “I am not knowledgeable.”  
The other half of the trials were inconsistent with negative self-relevant thinking about 
academics.  An incorrect selection produced a red “X” in the middle of the screen.  The next trial 
did not appear until the correct selection was made. 
After a series of practice trials to ensure that the participant understood the task, the 
experimental blocks began.  Each block consisted of 24 trials.  Three blocks of trials consistent 
with negative self-relevant academic thinking and three blocks of trials inconsistent with 
negative self-relevant academic thinking were randomly presented.  The IRAP program recorded 
latencies of correct responses. 
 
 
 
I am 
 
an achiever 
 
 
 
press ‘e’ for                     press ‘i’ for 
    TRUE                             FALSE 
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Procedure. 
Pre-intervention. Participants completed the LASSI Anxiety scale and OQ-45. 
Participants then completed the Academic Anxiety Mood Induction (see Appendix B) to focus 
their attention on thoughts of academic distress.  The exercise consisted of sixty statements on 
separate sheets of paper that participants read at a pace of one per 15 seconds.  The pace was 
kept by following recorded instructions to move to the next statement.  Statements were adapted 
from Velten (1968) and were designed to begin with a neutral statement and subsequently 
increase in anxiety.  Examples of statements include item 1: “Today is neither better nor worse 
than any other day,” item 30: “I feel so alone and scared about my academic future,” and item 
60: “My life is so full of problems in school that make me worried that I can’t handle it. I feel 
like I’ll explode with tension.”  After reading the statements, subjects were instructed to 
concentrate on their anxiety and feel it intensify while closing their eyes for 2 minutes.  The 
subjects completed the IRAP.  Discomfort/Believability/Willingness Rating Forms were 
completed immediately prior to the intervention. 
Intervention.  Participants signed up to do the study in groups of about fifteen in a 
classroom.  Six sessions were held and the condition used in each session was randomly 
assigned, with two sessions for each condition.  The experimenter presented each group of 
participants with one of the following interventions.  They were scripted and lasted 
approximately the same amount of time (several minutes).  
Defusion. The intervention began with a brief rationale for use of this technique with 
problematic thoughts.  This was demonstrated with the “Milk, Milk, Milk” repeated-word 
exercise (Hayes et al., 1999, p. 154).  Participants then practiced the repeated-word exercise with 
academic distress content (e.g., “I’m a failure”) for 60 seconds.  (see Appendix A) 
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Thought Control. The intervention began with a brief rationale for use of this technique 
with problematic thoughts.  Positive self-talk, breathing exercises, positive imagery, and thought-
stopping were demonstrated briefly.  The experimenter then reminded the participants of the 
academic distress content and instructed them to use these strategies to keep the thought away.  
The task was timed for 60 seconds.  (see Appendix A)  
No Instruction/Distraction. The experimenter instructed the participants to read an article 
on the ivory-billed woodpecker until she said, “stop.”  The participants read the article for a time 
equivalent to the other conditions.  
Post-Intervention. Discomfort/Believability/Willingness Rating Forms were completed 
immediately after the intervention.  The participants then completed the IRAP a second time.  
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III. RESULTS 
 
Equivalence of groups 
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference between groups in age, F (2, 94) = 
.198, p = .821.  Chi-square tests also revealed no significant differences between groups in 
gender, χ2 (4, N = 99) = 1.457, p = .834, or in race, χ2 (10, N = 99) = 8.783, p = .553.  
Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, skew, kurtosis) were calculated for LASSI 
Anxiety, AAQ-II, and OQ-45 separately for each condition (see tables 1, 2, and 3).  The skew 
and kurtosis were less than twice the standard error for each distribution, therefore adequate 
normality was assumed for use of ANOVAs.  One-way ANOVAs revealed that there were no 
significant differences between conditions for the LASSI Anxiety scale scores, F (2, 98) = 1.119, 
p = .331, AAQ-II scores, F (2, 98) = .977, p = .380, or OQ-45 scores, F (2, 98) = 1.487, p = .231. 
 
Table 1 
Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45) Descriptive Statistics 
 
Condition   N Mean            SD            Skew            Kurtosis 
 
Thought Control  32 54.56          18.130   .223  -.517  
 
Defusion Exercise  36 62.58          18.998   .204  -.228 
 
Read Article   31 60.16          21.298     -.164  -.073 
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Table 2 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II) Descriptive Statistics 
 
Condition   N Mean            SD            Skew            Kurtosis 
 
Thought Control  32 50.41          9.196   -.457  -.910 
 
Defusion Exercise  36 47.92          9.840   -.293  -1.031 
 
Read Article   31 47.00          11.121        -.317  .451 
 
 
Table 3 
LASSI Anxiety Scale Descriptive Statistics 
 
Condition   N Mean            SD            Skew            Kurtosis 
 
Thought Control  32 20.00            4.551        -.530  -1.095 
 
Defusion Exercise  36 18.61          4.265        -.494  -.775 
 
Read Article   31 19.81          3.609   -.032  .638 
 
 
Discomfort 
An analysis of covariance was conducted to determine whether the post-intervention 
discomfort ratings for the thought control, defusion, and article conditions differed after 
adjustments for differences in pre-intervention discomfort ratings.  Table 4 provides a descriptive 
summary of the pre- and post-intervention discomfort ratings, including the adjustments in the 
post-intervention discomfort means after controlling for the influence of the pre-intervention 
discomfort ratings.  Visual analysis of unadjusted pre- and post-intervention mean discomfort 
ratings is available in figure 1.  
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Table 4 
Discomfort Ratings Descriptive Statistics 
Condition  N Pre       Post Adjusted Adjusted Post 
    Mean       Mean Post Meana Std. Errora 
Thought Control 32 62.94       46.78 49.67  5.20 
Defusion Exercise 35 70.20       45.49 43.40  4.97 
Read Article  30 68.10       65.70 65.05  5.36 
Note. Adjustments based on pre discomfort = 67.15 
  
Figure 1 . Unadjusted mean discomfort ratings for each condition:  
Thought Control, Cognitive Defusion, and Reading an Article.  Error bars at 95% 
CI. 
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The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed with the Levene test, F (2, 
94) = 2.480, p = .089.  A linear relationship between the pre- and post-intervention discomfort 
ratings for all groups was confirmed by graphic analysis of a scatterplot fitted with least squares 
regression lines (Figure 2).  The assumption of equal regression slopes was supported by finding 
no significant interaction between the pre-intervention discomfort ratings and the intervention 
condition, F (2, 91) = .477, p = .622.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Pre- and post-intervention discomfort ratings: data points and regression lines 
per group. 
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As indicated in the discomfort ANCOVA summary (Table 5), pre-intervention ratings 
were significantly related to the post-intervention scores, F (1, 93) = 53.25, p = .000, partial η2 = 
.364.  After adjusting the group means for the pre-intervention discomfort ratings, intervention 
condition was found to have a significant effect on post-intervention discomfort ratings, F (2, 93) 
= 4.57, p = .013, partial η2 = .089.  Thus, the amount of decrease in discomfort ratings depended 
on the condition.  
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that the defusion intervention resulted in post 
discomfort ratings that were significantly lower than those in the article condition (mean 
difference = -21.65, p = .012).  Thus the defusion intervention reduced discomfort ratings 
relative to the control condition.  The difference between the post discomfort ratings in the 
thought control and article conditions was not significant (mean difference = -15.38, p = .127), 
nor was the difference between the defusion and the thought control conditions (mean difference 
= -6.27, p = 1.00). 
 
Table 5 
Discomfort Ratings ANCOVA Results 
Source       SS         df            MS        F           Sig. Partial η2 
Pre Discomfort  45845         1  45845        53.25 .000 .364 
Condition  7870         2  3935        4.57 .013 .089  
Error   80069         93 861 
 
Believability 
An analysis of covariance was conducted to determine whether the post-intervention 
believability ratings for the thought control, defusion, and article conditions differed after 
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adjustments for differences in pre-intervention believability ratings.  Table 6 provides a 
descriptive summary of the pre- and post-intervention believability ratings, including the 
adjustments in the post-intervention believability means after controlling for the influence of the 
pre-intervention believability ratings.  Visual analysis of unadjusted pre- and post-intervention 
mean believability ratings is available in figure 3.   
 
 
Table 6 
Believability Ratings Descriptive Statistics 
Condition  N Pre       Post Adjusted Adjusted Post 
    Mean       Mean Post Meana Std. Errora 
Thought Control 32 26.63       14.31 16.13  3.42 
Defusion Exercise 35 25.66       22.14 24.59  3.27 
Read Article  30 36.77       33.43 28.63  3.56 
Note. Adjustments based on pre believability = 29.41 
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Figure 3 . Unadjusted mean believability ratings for each condition: Thought Control, 
Cognitive Defusion, and Reading an article.  Error bars at 95% CI. 
 
The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed with the Levene test, F (2, 
94) = 1.33, p = .268.  A linear relationship between the pre- and post-intervention believabiliy 
ratings for all groups was confirmed by graphic analysis of a scatterplot fitted with least squares 
regression lines (Figure 4).  The assumption of equal regression slopes was supported by finding 
no significant interaction between the pre-intervention believability ratings and the intervention 
condition, F (2, 91) = 1.99, p = .142.  
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Figure 4.  Pre- and post-intervention believability ratings: data points and regression lines 
per group. 
 
As indicated in the believability ANCOVA summary (Table 7), pre-intervention ratings 
were significantly related to the post-intervention scores, F (1, 93) = 101, p = .000, partial η2 = 
.521.  After adjusting the group means for the pre-intervention believability ratings, intervention 
condition was found to have a significant effect on post-intervention believability ratings, F(2, 
93) = 3.37, p = .039, partial η2 = .068.  Thus, the amount of decrease in believability ratings 
depended on the condition.  
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that the thought control intervention resulted 
in post believability ratings that were significantly lower than those in the article condition (mean 
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difference = -12.50, p = .040).  Thus the thought control intervention reduced believability 
ratings significantly relative to the control condition.  The difference between the post 
believability ratings in the defusion and article conditions was not significant (mean difference = 
-4.04, p = 1.00), nor was the difference between the thought control and the defusion conditions 
(mean difference = -8.46, p = .23). 
 
Table 7 
Believability Ratings ANCOVA Results 
Source       SS         df            MS        F           Sig. Partial η2 
Pre Believability  37776         1  37776        101 .000 .521  
Condition  2520         2  1260        3.37 .039 .068  
Error   34749         93 373 
 
 
Willingness 
An analysis of covariance was conducted to determine whether the post-intervention 
willingness ratings for the thought control, defusion, and article conditions differed after 
adjustments for differences in pre-intervention willingness ratings.  Table 8 provides a 
descriptive summary of the pre- and post-intervention willingness ratings, including the 
adjustments in the post-intervention willingness means after controlling for the influence of the 
pre-intervention willingness ratings.  Visual analysis of unadjusted pre- and post-intervention 
mean willingness ratings is available in figure 5.   
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Table 8 
Willingness Ratings Descriptive Statistics 
Condition  N Pre       Post Adjusted Adjusted Post 
    Mean       Mean Post Meana Std. Errora 
Thought Control 32 21.97       14.44 14.59  2.96 
Defusion Exercise 35 23.29       20.89 20.23  2.83 
Read Article  30 21.23       24.60 25.20  3.06 
Note. Adjustments based on pre willingness = 22.22 
 
 
 
Figure 5 . Unadjusted mean willingness ratings for each condition: Thought Control, 
Cognitive Defusion, and Reading an article.  Error bars at 95% CI. 
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The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed with the Levene test, F (2, 
94) = 2.31, p = .105.  A linear relationship between the pre- and post-intervention willingness 
ratings for all groups was confirmed by graphic analysis of a scatter plot fitted with least squares 
regression lines (Figure 6).  The assumption of equal regression slopes was supported by finding 
no significant interaction between the pre-intervention willingness ratings and the intervention 
condition, F (2, 91) = 1.91, p = .154.  
 
Figure 6.  Pre- and post-intervention willingness ratings: data points and regression lines 
per group. 
 
As indicated in the willingness ANCOVA summary (Table 9), pre-intervention ratings 
were significantly related to the post-intervention scores, F (1, 93) = 79.22, p = .000, partial η2 = 
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.460.  After adjusting the group means for the pre-intervention willingness ratings, intervention 
condition was found to have a significant effect on post-intervention willingness ratings, F(2, 93) 
= 3.12, p = .049, partial η2 = .063.  Thus, the amount of decrease in willingness ratings depended 
on the condition. 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that the thought control intervention resulted 
in post willingness ratings that were significantly lower than those in the article condition (mean 
difference = -10.61, p = .043).  Thus the thought control intervention reduced willingness ratings 
significantly relative to the control condition.  The difference between the post willingness 
ratings in the defusion and article conditions was not significant (mean difference = -4.97, p = 
.71), nor was the difference between the thought control and the defusion conditions (mean 
difference = -5.64, p = .52). 
 
Table 9 
Willingness Ratings ANCOVA Results 
Source       SS         df            MS        F           Sig. Partial η2 
Pre Willingness  22194         1  22194        79.22 .000 .460 
Condition  1749         2  875        3.12 .049 .063  
Error   26056         93 280 
 
 
IRAP 
Transformation to DIRAP scores.  The IRAP program records latency of correct 
responses in milliseconds.  The raw latency data are most often transformed into DIRAP scores for 
analysis.  Data from individuals with unusually slow or fast responding are eliminated and 
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latency scores are divided by standard deviations.  This is intended to reduce variance due to 
individual differences such as age and cognitive ability and allow for better group comparisons.  
These transformations involve distinguishing four different trial types in the IRAP. Trial 
types in our IRAP are determined by the category stimulus (“I am” or “I am not”) and the type of 
target stimulus—a positive academic word or a negative academic word (“an achiever” or “a 
failure”). Trial types are “I am-positive,” “I am-negative,” “I am not-positive,” and “I am not-
negative.”  Either “true” or “false” is the correct response to each trial, determining whether the 
trial is consistent or inconsistent with negative self-relevant thinking about academics. 
Steps for transformation from raw latency to DIRAP scores are outlined by Barnes-Holmes 
and colleagues (2010, p. 533):  
(1) Only response-latency data from test blocks are used; (2) latencies        
above 10,000 ms from the data set are eliminated; (3) all data for a participant are 
removed if he or she produces more than 10% of test-block trials with latencies 
less than 300 ms; (4) 12 standard deviations for the four trial types are computed: 
four from the response latencies from Test Blocks 1 and 2, four from the latencies 
from Test Blocks 3 and 4, and a further four from Test Blocks 5 and 6; (5) 24 
mean latencies for the four trial types in each test block are calculated; (6) 
difference scores are calculated for each of the four trial types for each pair of test 
blocks by subtracting the mean latency of the consistent block from the mean 
latency of the corresponding inconsistent block; (7) each difference score is 
divided by its corresponding standard deviation from step 4, yielding DIRAP 
scores, one score for each trial type for each pair of test blocks; (8) four overall 
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trial-type DIRAP scores, or IRAP effects, are calculated by averaging the scores for 
each trial type across the three pairs of test blocks.  
These four trial-type DIRAP scores were averaged for an overall DIRAP score that was used in our 
analysis.  Remember that ultimately, the DIRAP score indicates the difference in latency in 
responding in ways that are consistent or inconsistent with negative self-relevant thinking about 
academics. 
IRAP Analysis (ANCOVA).  An analysis of covariance was conducted to determine 
whether the post-intervention DIRAP scores for the thought control, defusion, and article 
conditions differed after adjustments for differences in pre-intervention DIRAP scores.  Two 
participants were eliminated from analysis as part of the DIRAP algorithm, due to very short 
response latencies.  A third was eliminated due to having a blank datasheet from the IRAP. Table 
10 provides a descriptive summary of the pre- and post-intervention DIRAP scores, including the 
adjustments in the post-intervention DIRAP means after controlling for the influence of the pre-
intervention DIRAP scores.  
 
 
Table 10 
DIRAP Descriptive Statistics 
Condition  N Pre       Post Adjusted Adjusted Post 
    Mean       Mean Post Meana Std. Errora 
Thought Control 30 .319       .298 .287  .049 
Defusion Exercise 35 .269       .262 .276  .045 
Read Article  30 .309       .209 .203  .048 
Note. Adjustments based on Pre DIRAP = .297 
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The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed with the Levene test, F (2, 
92) = .260, p = .772.  A linear relationship between the pre- and post-intervention DIRAP scores 
for all groups was confirmed by graphic analysis of a scatterplot fitted with least squares 
regression lines (Figure 7).  The assumption of equal regression slopes was supported by finding 
no significant interaction between the pre-intervention DIRAP scores and the intervention 
condition, F (2, 89) = .886, p = .416.  
As indicated in the IRAP ANCOVA summary (Table 11), pre-intervention scores were 
significantly related to the post-intervention scores, F (1, 91) = 29.43, p = .000, partial η2 = .244.  
After adjusting the group means for the pre-intervention DIRAP scores, intervention condition was 
found to have a non-significant effect on post-intervention DIRAP scores, F (2, 91) = .906, p = 
.408, partial η2 = .020.  Thus the IRAP did not indicate an increase in psychological flexibility 
due to any intervention condition.  
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Figure 7.  Pre- and post-intervention DIRAP scores: data points and regression lines per 
group. 
 
Table 11 
DIRAP ANCOVA Results 
Source       SS         df            MS        F           Sig. Partial η2 
Pre DIRAP   2.073         1  2.073        29.43 .000  
Condition  .128         2  .064        .906 .408   
Error   6.412         91 .070 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
 The effect of a specific cognitive defusion exercise, with specific distressing thought 
content, was examined in the present study.  A word repetition defusion intervention was 
compared with a thought control intervention.  A distraction task (reading an article) was used as 
an experimental control condition.  The thought content used in the exercises reflected academic 
distress.  Participants were undergraduate students who were primed to feel anxious about 
academic failure.  The statement “I am a failure” was rated for discomfort, believability, and 
willingness pre- and post-intervention. 
 No significant differences were found for post-intervention ratings (discomfort, 
believability, willingness) between the defusion and thought control interventions.  The defusion 
exercise did result in significantly lower ratings of discomfort than the control condition.  The 
thought control exercise did result in significantly lower ratings of believability than the control 
condition.  Willingness ratings were expected to increase in the defusion condition, but they did 
not.  Willingness ratings decreased significantly in the thought control condition relative to the 
distraction condition. 
 The IRAP was also administered pre- and post-intervention to assess any change in 
psychological flexibility.  It was hoped that the IRAP would serve as a behavioral measure of 
defusion, to add to the self-report ratings of discomfort, believability, and willingness.  The 
IRAP compared response latency to tasks consistent and inconsistent with negative self-relevant 
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thinking about academics.  No significant effect was found between conditions for the IRAP, 
indicating no difference in effect on psychological flexibility. 
The lack of difference on outcome measures following defusion and thought control 
conditions is unexpected given Masuda and colleagues’ (2004, 2010) previous findings of 
defusion’s superiority in similar comparisons.  The protocol used in the interventions in this 
study was modeled after their initial investigation (Masuda et al., 2004), but there were some 
differences.  These previous studies had participants produce their own negative self-referential 
statements and then reduce these to one word for use in the defusion exercise.  This study, in 
contrast, used a short sentence (I am a failure) for every participant in the repeated-word 
defusion exercise. Masuda and colleagues’ (2004) initial study comparing defusion to thought 
control was a small time-series study, where the interventions were administered individually.  
However, the more recent study (Masuda et al., 2010) was delivered in a group format just as the 
present study.  
 Willingness ratings were not taken in the studies discussed above, but were found to 
increase as a result of defused presentations of negative self-statements by Healy and colleagues 
(2008).  This was a different defusion task than used in the present study, with 10 different 
negative self-statements presented visually.  Those differences could account for this study’s 
finding of word repetition’s lack of effect on willingness ratings. 
One limitation of this study, which was identified by Masuda and colleagues (2010) with 
a similar protocol, is that the thought control task was less structured during the 30 second 
intervention period than the defusion exercise.  In the defusion exercise, participants were 
repeating thought content out loud throughout the 30 seconds.  In the thought control task, 
participants were instructed not to think of the thought content and were only reminded of this 
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once in the 30 second period.  How exactly participants were responding to their own thoughts 
during this time was likely to have been more varied than in the defusion condition. 
Masuda and colleagues (2010) also point out that the differences in process between 
defusion exercises and thought control/distraction exercises have not yet been clearly delineated.  
It is possible that similar processes are occurring in both interventions.  Masuda and colleagues’ 
(2010) study found that thought distraction had significant effects compared to the control 
condition.  
Masuda and colleagues (2010) suggest that the believability measure might not have been 
sensitive enough to detect some changes due to defusion in their study.  They suggest that 
instead of “how believable (true) is the thought?” better alternatives could be “how much do you 
experience the thought simply as a mental event, rather than as an absolute fact about you?” or 
“how OK is it for you to have this thought?”  They suggest that these questions might better 
detect changes due to the process of defusion.  This could also be the case in the present study. 
Masuda and colleagues (2010) noted their reliance on self-report measures alone as a 
limitation of their study.  The present study attempted to address this with the inclusion of the 
IRAP. However, the IRAP has its own limitations, yet lacking evidence of reliability or validity.  
It is not clear if the IRAP would have measured any potential changes due to the defusion 
exercise.  Methods to directly assess defusion processes would further research in this area. 
Unfortunately such methods have yet to be developed. 
It is possible that the present study did not find the expected effect of defusion due to the 
characteristics of the population.  Participants were undergraduate students, and though they 
were exposed to a procedure intended to induce academic anxiety, it could be that academic 
concerns were not particularly relevant for a portion of the sample.  The phrase “I am a failure,” 
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following the academic anxiety induction exercise, might not have been very meaningful for 
some of the participants.  A sample of individuals on academic probation could be used in future 
studies to address this concern.  Or participants could be screened for academic distress prior to 
inclusion.  It is also possible that the word repetition defusion exercise is an effective technique, 
but not in every population or with every psychological difficulty.   
Future studies could vary the dose and timing of the intervention, perhaps exposing 
participants to the intervention at several time points.  This would be more similar to the way that 
defusion exercises are used in clinical situations.  In treatment, exercises are often repeated or 
several defusion exercises are used within a therapy session, with treatment spread over weeks.      
Future studies should address these limitations and examine the repeated-word defusion 
technique, as well as other defusion exercises, in other contexts.  These techniques would 
ultimately be used as part of clinical interventions, so it would make sense to focus studies on 
samples with specific clinical difficulties.  Improvement in measuring the process of defusion 
would aid tremendously in research investigating defusion as a mediator or mechanism in ACT.  
Careful examination of components of ACT as a treatment should help in its development as an 
empirically based intervention. Defusion as a process in ACT cannot be assumed to be an active 
ingredient without ongoing empirical investigation. 
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ACT Defusion 
 
Experimenter (E): As a species, language, including thoughts and words, gives us 
the blessings and the curse of knowledge. The power of language has pros and 
cons: there is a "light side" and a "dark side". On the positive side, we can 
influence the environment and create a comfortable life. Just look around in 
this room. Lights, chairs, central heating, and clothes we are wearing… 
Without language and our thoughts (e.g., logical thinking), these would not be 
here.  On the dark side, however, we are the only species that worries. In the 
extreme case, we are the only species that commits suicide. 
  
The dark side becomes dominant when we believe that our thoughts are 
literally what they say they are, especially thoughts about ourselves that could 
be evaluative and judgmental. For example, "I am no good." And we tend to 
think of our thoughts, of what they say, as the reality or as the criteria of the 
reality. For example, you are what your thoughts say who you are, what you 
are, and how you are. However, are you really what your thoughts say you are? 
  
What if I say that thoughts are simply what they are (thoughts are just 
thoughts), rather than what they say they are. OR you are not what they say 
you are. It might be difficult to get this point, so let's do a little exercise. 
 
As I say, this exercise sounds silly. I'm going to ask you to say a word. Then 
you tell me what comes to mind. I want you to say the word, "Milk". 
 
Participant (P): Milk. 
E: Good. Now tell me what comes to mind when you said it? 
P: (I have milk at home in the refrigerator). 
E: O.K. what else? What shows up when we say "Milk". 
P: (I picture it---white, a glass). 
E: Good what else? (Can you taste it?). Can you feel what it feels like to drink a 
glass of milk? Cold, creamy, coats your mouth…right? 
E: O.K. let's see if this fits. What came across your mind were things about actual 
milk and your experience with it. All that happened is that we made a strange 
sound — Milk (say it slowly!) --- and lots of those things show up. Notice that 
there isn't any milk in this room, not at all. But milk was in the room 
psychologically. You and I were seeing it, tasting it, and feeling it. And yet, 
only the word was actually here. 
E: Now, here is another exercise. The exercise is a little silly, and you might feel 
embarrassed doing it, but I am going to do it with you so we can all be silly 
together. What I am going to ask you to do is to say the word, "milk," out loud, 
over-and-over again, and as rapidly as possible, and then notice what happens. 
Are you ready? 
E: O.K., Let's do it. Say "milk" over and over again!  
(20 seconds). 
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E: O.K. now stop. Tell me what came to mind while you kept repeating it? 
P: (e.g., Gone, it sounds funny, it was just a sound) 
E: Did you notice what happened to the psychological aspects of milk that were 
here a few minutes ago? 
P:  
E: Right, a creamy, cold, gluggy stuff just goes away. When you said it the first 
time, it was as if milk was actually here, in the room. But all that really 
happened was that you just said that word. The first time you said it, it was 
"psychologically" meaning-full, and it was almost solid. But when you said it 
again and again and again, you began to loose that meaning and the words 
became just a sound.  
E: What I am suggesting is that… What happens in this exercise may be applied 
to our personal thoughts about ourselves. When you say things to yourself in 
addition to any meaning behind those words, isn't it also true that these 
thoughts are just thoughts. The thoughts are just smoke, there isn't anything 
solid in them. 
 
 
E: Now, your task here is to say the thought "XXX ," out loud, over and over 
again, as rapidly as possible until I say "stop". Do you have any questions?  
P: (the participant may or may not ask questions about the procedure) 
E:O. K., are you ready? Now, begin (Experimenter may repeat the thought with 
the participants initially to prompt them to follow the protocol). 
(60 seconds) 
E: Stop!  
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Thought Control 
 
Experimenter (E): It is often conceptualized that the core of our emotional and 
psychological suffering is caused by our negative thoughts, such as negative 
thoughts about the situation, oneself, and the future. From this perspective, 
these thoughts are considered to affect our subsequent actions.  
This notion has been supported culturally in our society. We can see this 
attribution of cause in our daily lives. For example, "I cannot ask her out, 
because (I think) I'm not attractive enough." "(I think) I am stupid and that 
thought makes me feel miserable." We have a tendency to believe that our 
thoughts are the reason or cause of our actions.  
One way to prevent this pattern is to remove or control your negative 
thoughts. Controlling them by distracting yourself, thinking something 
different, or suppressing them, trying to get rid of them.  
When you think something negative, You will tell yourself, "Stop! Stop 
thinking about it." What are your strategies to deal with your negative thoughts 
when they appear in mind? 
Participant (P):   
E: O.K., Good. What else? 
P: 
E: O.K., so now let's review what psychotherapy literatures say about controlling 
thoughts and feelings. In psychotherapy, there are several techniques to control 
your thoughts and feelings so that you don't have to feel as much discomfort. 
These are 1) positive self-talk, 2) breathing training, and 3) positive imagery. 
In positive self-talk, you say something positive to yourself whenever you have 
a negative thought. Can you tell me some positive thoughts? 
P:  
E: Good, now for breathing training, I want you to put your hand on your 
stomach, and do as I say. I want you to breath slowly, inhaling the air from 
your nose, and hold it for a while, and exhale it from the mouth slowly. 
E: Positive imagery is similar to positive self-talk, you simply visualize something 
positive in your mind, such as a beautiful beach, calm lake, and so on. All of 
these techniques are designed to remove your uncomfortable thoughts. 
 
E: Now let's do a little exercise. I want you to say "XXX.” Say it once now. 
Participant (P): XXX 
E: O.K. Your task is to NOT think of the words, "XXX". You must try hard not to 
think "XXX" until I say, "STOP". If you have any questions, please ask me 
now. 
P: (the participant may or may not ask questions about the procedure) 
E: Are you ready? Now, begin (The experimenter will say "Don’t' think of XXX " 
once in the 30th second of the session).   
(60 seconds) 
E: Stop!  
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No Instruction Condition (reading an article) 
 
 
Experimenter (E): Please read this article until I say "Stop". If you have questions, please 
ask me now. 
 
(5 minutes) 
 
Experimenter (E): O.K., Stop. Remember the thought “XXX.” I would like you say it 
once.  
Participant (P): XXX 
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Appendix B: Measures 
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PRE: Discomfort, Believability, & Willingness Rating Form 
 
 
 
 “I am a failure.”    
  
 
1). How uncomfortable is the thought? Please mark (√) on the dashed line. 
 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
   
Not at all Uncomfortable 
 
Very Uncomfortable 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
2). How believable (true) is the thought? 
 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
   
Not at all Believable 
 
Very Believable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3). How willing are you to have this thought? 
 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
   
Not at all Willing 
 
Very Willing 
 
 
  
 
52 
 
 
 
POST: Discomfort, Believability, & Willingness Rating Form 
 
 
 
 “I am a failure.”    
  
 
1). How uncomfortable is the thought? Please mark (√) on the dashed line. 
 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
   
Not at all Uncomfortable 
 
Very Uncomfortable 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
2). How believable (true) is the thought? 
 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
   
Not at all Believable 
 
Very Believable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3). How willing are you to have this thought? 
 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
   
Not at all Willing 
 
Very Willing 
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LASSI Anxiety Scale (all items except #5 are reverse scored; higher score = less anxiety) 
 
Rate how much the statement is typical of you: 
 
 
1. I worry that I will flunk out of school. 
 
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5 
not at all                   not very                   somewhat                   fairly                 very much 
 
2. I get discouraged because of low grades. 
 
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5 
not at all                   not very                   somewhat                   fairly                 very much 
 
3. I am very tense when I study. 
 
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5 
not at all                   not very                   somewhat                   fairly                 very much 
 
4. Even when I am well prepared for a test, I feel very anxious. 
 
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5 
not at all                   not very                   somewhat                   fairly                 very much 
 
5. When I begin an examination, I feel pretty confident that I will do well. 
 
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5 
not at all                   not very                   somewhat                   fairly                 very much 
 
6. Worrying about doing poorly interferes with my concentration on tests. 
 
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5 
not at all                   not very                   somewhat                   fairly                 very much 
 
7. I feel very panicky when I take an important test. 
 
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5 
not at all                   not very                   somewhat                   fairly                 very much 
 
8. I get so nervous and confused when taking an examination that I fail to answer 
questions to the best of my ability. 
 
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5 
not at all                   not very                   somewhat                   fairly                 very much 
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AAQ-2 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling a 
number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never 
 true 
very 
seldom 
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost 
always true 
always  
true 
       
1. Its OK if I remember something unpleasant. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My painful experiences and memories make it 
difficult for me to live a life that I would value. 
(Reverse) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I’m afraid of my feelings. (Reverse) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I worry about not being able to control my worries 
and feelings. (Reverse) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My painful memories prevent me from having a 
fulfilling life. (Reverse) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am in control of my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Emotions cause problems in my life. (Reverse) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. It seems like most people are handling their lives 
better than I am. (Reverse) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Worries get in the way of my success. (Reverse) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of 
how I want to live my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Demographic Information 
 
 
Age (in years):    _______ 
 
 
For the remaining items, please circle your answers—circle only one answer per 
question. 
 
 
Country of Origin (where you have lived the majority of your life): 
 
1United States  2Other 
 
 
Education (choose your current level of education): 
 
1freshman   2sophomore  3junior  4senior  5graduate 
 
 
Political Affiliation (select the party that you most identify with): 
 
1Democrat 2Republican 3Other 
 
 
Race (select the ethnicity that you most identify with):  
 
1African-American     2Asian    3Caucasian     4Hispanic     5Other 
 
 
Religion (select the category that you most identify with): 
 
1Agnostic     2Atheist     3Buddhist     4Christian     5Hindu     6Jewish   7Muslim     8Other 
 
Sex:  
 
1Female     2Male 
 
 
Socioeconomic Status (if someone other than you is providing more than 50% of your 
income, please report his or her annual income instead): 
 
1$10,000 or less     2$10,001-$20,000     3$20,001-$40,000     4$40,001-$60,000     
5$60,000 or more 
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Academic Anxiety Mood Induction 
 
Oral instructions: 
 
“You will read self referent, mood related statements at the rate of one per 15 seconds. 
Concentrate on the mood associated with each statement and think of things in your own 
life that reflects the mood represented by each statement. After you have read 60 
statements, you will read a set of incubation instructions designed to build the mood even 
more. After that, you will sit for 2 minutes while concentrating on building the mood. If 
the task becomes too uncomfortable, raise your hand, and the experimenter will excuse 
you from the task.” 
 
Academic Anxiety Statements 
 
1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day. 
2. I’m an incredibly anxious person when it comes to academics. 
3. I’m haunted with thoughts about myself and how I come across to others in 
classes. 
4. I feel distressed by thoughts about college that disturb me. 
5. I’m worried that the potential for failing may get a lot worse. 
6. School makes me fret with concern in general. 
7. I feel needled and badgered with racing thoughts about grades. 
8. It takes too much effort to try to relax—I feel too agitated to study. 
9. I think about the same aggravating worries about school day after day. 
10. I’m afraid that the potential for me to fail may get a lot worse. I’m afraid for my 
future. 
11. I’m edgy and very worried about grades. 
12. My mind is troubled and harried by all the schoolwork I have to do. 
13. I feel incredibly vexed and concerned about academics today. 
14. I wish I could stop thinking about things like failing that make my blood run cold. 
15. My mind is sometimes racing about school—I couldn’t relax if I wanted to. 
16. I can’t communicate because I’m too confused in my mind about my academic 
future. 
17. I’m plagued by my racing mind, with thoughts about college. 
18. There have been days when I felt unnerved and anxious and unable to do any 
schoolwork. 
19. It seems like my body may start to shake and tremble during tests. 
20. I feel like I’m on pins and needles thinking about school. 
21. Even when I try to relax—I’m always worried about school. 
22. I feel hounded by my own thoughts about school. 
23. I have too many concerns about my classes—I don’t know what to do. 
24. I’m so tense that I’m having trouble remembering things for tests. 
25. It’s so frightening, how tense I feel when I try to study. 
26. I have the feeling that I will never calm down enough to succeed in college. 
27. My mind is racing with all the concerns and problems about school that make me 
anxious. 
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28. I’ve lain awake at night worrying about never succeeding in school. 
29. There have been days that I have worried so much about failing that I seemed to 
do little else. 
30. I feel so alone and scared about my academic future. 
31. I’m much more anxious about grades than when I was younger—I seem to be 
getting worse. 
32. Too often I have found myself filled with a sense of dread, thinking worrisome 
thoughts when I definitely should have been studying. 
33. My mind is troubled and full of dread about my future. 
34. I’m beginning to feel so uptight that I’m getting more and more worried thoughts 
about school. 
35. I’m horribly concerned about my family knowing how much I’m struggling in 
college. 
36. All of my academic fears and nightmares seem to be taking possession of me. 
37. It has occurred to me more than once that studying is basically useless because I 
feel too restless and agitated to concentrate. 
38. I’m an incredibly uptight person when it comes to schoolwork. 
39. I’m terribly tense and annoyed by my thoughts—I can’t study. 
40. I’m so worried that I can’t concentrate on anything. 
41. I worry so much about failing that I can’t stand it. 
42. I’m getting nervous and anxious about my studies, I can feel the muscles in my 
body getting more and more tense. 
43. I’m too scared—I don’t know what to do about school. 
44. When I feel this anxious about school, I fear that I may have a heart attack. My 
health may not be as good as it’s supposed to be. 
45. Every now and then I feel so worried that I can’t sit still or get any school work 
accomplished. 
46. I can’t think of anything except my worries about failing. 
47. I couldn’t relax or calm down now if I had to. 
48. At times I’ve been so fearful and scared that I ran away from academic problems 
rather than face them. 
49. No matter how hard I try, I can’t stop this feeling of panic and doom about my 
future. 
50. I’ve lain awake nights unable to sleep because I’m so terrified about school. 
51. It feels like I may start trembling like a leaf—I’m unable to work on the things I 
know I must get done. 
52. I can’t stop worrying—my whole life makes me feel like I’m going to burst. 
53. I’m so scared about my future that I feel like my hair is standing on end. 
54. Sometimes I feel like I might have a panic attack. 
55. I’m so afraid—my academic struggles make me feel tense and worried. I feel like 
I have no control. 
56. A sense of foreboding and dread fills me with fear that I will fail. 
57. At times I’ve been so worried that I’ve had trouble sleeping and facing going to 
class. 
58. My life is so full of things to do for classes that fill me with dread that I can’t 
stand it. 
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59. I feel paralyzed with fear—some very important decisions about my future are 
almost impossible to make. 
60. My life is so full of problems in school that make me worried that I can’t handle 
it. I feel like I’ll explode with tension. 
 
 
 
Incubation Instructions 
 
Now that you’re feeling very anxious about school, concentrate on this feeling. Feel it 
getting stronger and stronger; more and more worried. Let it continue to build. Think 
about things that have happened in your academic life that have made you feel very, very 
anxious; like an upcoming exam, or telling your parents that you are doing poorly, or like 
being frightened about your future. Concentrate on it. Let yourself feel very jittery, 
worried, very anxious, very terrified. As you do, you’ll feel the mood build. It’ll become 
more intense, more anxious. This in turn will make you think of other things about 
college that have made you feel very, very anxious. The mood will continue to build. Feel 
it become more intense. Feel it get stronger and stronger. It will happen. Do and think 
whatever you can to build this very anxious mood. Feel very, very anxious about your 
academic future. Close your eyes. Begin now. (2 minutes) 
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